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The new European General Data Protection Regulation
has introduced several new rights designed to empower
users and regulate imbalances of power between those
who collect and control data and those to whom the data
refer. In this paper we focus on one particular right, the
right to data portability, and examine how it is being
implemented. We discuss the responses to 230 real-world
data portability requests, and examine the file formats
returned and difficulties in making and interpreting
requests. We find variation in file formats, not all of which
meet the GDPR requirements, and confusion amongst
data controllers about the various GDPR rights.
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Introduction
The introduction of the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) [12] has been called “the most
significant data reform process in history” [8]. This new
law introduces a number of new rights for data subjects,
which are intended to rebalance power between citizens
and the increasingly sizeable and international companies
that are collecting and exploiting data from them.
As the GDPR has only just come into effect, it is timely
to study how this Regulation will work in practice. In this
paper we examine one right in particular, the right to data
portability (RtDP). We conduct 230 data portability
requests, and discuss the success or failure of these
requests, the types of data formats used, and the
completeness of the requests. We show some of the
potential impediments that face data subjects in
exercising the RtDP, and discuss future areas for work
that could help overcome these problems.
The GDPR
Repealing the Data Protection Directive (DPD) [11], the
GDPR came into force on 25th May 2018. The previous
DPD was introduced in 1995, and with the rise in
international processing of big datasets and increased
surveillance both by states and private companies, a new
Regulation was required to modernise and harmonise data
protection across EU Member States, irrespective of a
data subject’s nationality or residence.
The GDPR, like the DPD, provides several rights for data
subjects (those about whom personal data are collected)
to exercise against data controllers (those who collect or
determine what these data are used for). While some
rights in the GDPR already existed under the DPD, such
as the right to access data or the right to rectify data, the
Regulation also introduces new rights, such as the focus
of this paper, Article 20’s RtDP. This right aims to allow
data subjects to obtain and reuse their personal data for
their own purposes across different services. The RtDP is
particularly interesting as it discusses different aspects of
technology while attempting to remain technologically
neutral. As a whole, the GDPR does not depend on the
techniques used (GDPR Recital 15). In the context of
data portability, however, certain technologies may be
required for its implementation. The RtDP therefore
makes for a good case study exploring whether new
technology is needed to fully exercise these new powers.
The RtDP requires that “the data subject shall have the
right to receive the personal data concerning him or her,
which he or she has provided to a controller, in a
structured, commonly used and machine-readable format
and have the right to transmit those data to another
controller without hindrance from the controller to which
the personal data have been provided” (GDPR Article
20(1)) processed based on consent or by contract, and
carried out by automated means.
The requirements of EU data protection law are laid out
in the GDPR itself, but additional guidance is provided
through data protection authorities, either of individual
member states such as the UK’s Information
Commissioner’s Office (ICO), or the EU-wide Article 29
Data Protection Working Party (A29WP) or the new
European Data Protection Board (EDPB). The A29WP’s
guidelines on data portability [1] clarify the main elements
of data portability, when the RtDP applies, and how
portable data must be provided. The A29WP and the
GDPR do not prescribe the implementation of how the
RtDP should be achieved. The A29WP does, however,
describe what data should be included in response to a
portability request. The term “provided” in Article 20 is
interpreted broadly by the A29WP to include data actively
and knowingly provided by the data subject and data
gathered by virtue of the use of the data controller’s
service or servicing device. Notably, this does not include
data inferred or derived after analysis. The ICO further
provides explanation of Article 20’s “structured,
commonly used and machine-readable format” with
reference to the Open Data Handbook [20].
When exercising Article 20, data controllers must ensure
that the correct data subject is identified. Additional
information may be asked to enable the identification of a
data subject if there is reasonable doubt about their
identity (Article 12(6)). When further information and
proof of identity is received, data controllers cannot refuse
to act upon the data subject’s request (Article 12(2)).
Once confirmed, the data controller has up to one month,
or up to three months if the size of data requested is
significant, and without undue delay to comply (Article
12(3)).
The right to receive portable personal data is not the
same as making data interoperable across different
platforms. In the EU, interoperability is defined as “the
ability of disparate and diverse organisations to interact
towards mutually beneficial and agreed common goals,
involving the sharing of information and knowledge
between the organisations, through the business processes
they support, by means of the exchange of data between
their respective ICT systems” (Article 2) [10]. Article 20’s
requirements for structured and machine-readable formats
and clearly-defined metadata are important for data files
to be interoperable, but despite pressure from lawyers and
academics, mandatory interoperability provisions have not
been included in the GDPR [4]. The A29WP’s guidance
clarifies that interoperability and the production of
interoperable systems are only desired outcomes.
Data Portability in Context
Before the GDPR, data portability was grounded in
competition law under Article 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union for abuse of
dominance and exclusionary conduct as well as the
Sherman Act and Clayton Act in the US. With the
potential for service providers to “lock-in” consumers and
make it more difficult for them to leave the platform, data
portability is seen as a solution allowing users to move
from one service to another. Technical solutions to data
portability have been proposed for some time: McCown
and Nelson suggested mechanisms for using the Facebook
API, browser extension archiving frameworks, and third
party web archivers to extract personal data to breakaway
from the “walled garden” [18], and Bojars et al. argue
that implementing data portability for social networks
using Semantic Web technology is technically feasible and
comes at almost zero-cost for developers [3]. Beyond
advantages for users, Van der Auwermeulen argues that
there is also an economic interest for providers to offer
data portability [24]. The possibility for portable data
encourages users to put more of their personal data onto
platforms with the trust that they can transmit it later.
Data portability is not without disadvantages. Swire and
Lagos argue that data portability in the then-draft GDPR
may reduce consumer welfare as it places excessive burden
on small and medium enterprises by disregarding market
power [21]. Security challenges may also arise as the
complexity of control and process of personal data
increases with more portable data [25]. More specifically
to data portability as a right, Graef et al. consider how
the RtDP clashes with competition law and consumer
protection law where data portability is seen as a duty and
a form of property-like control respectively [13]. If
justifications for data portability are poorly-defined,
portability may become a goal in itself with little impact
on the protection of personal data [14].
As a new right, data portability has yet to be tried and
tested. Ursic suggests that the RtDP could establish
control over personal data transfers, enable (re)use of
personal data, enable better understanding of data flows,
and allow free development of personality and facilitate
equality [23]. To avoid adverse effects on competition and
innovation, Engels argues that the nuances of platform
market characteristics should be considered during the
enforcement and interpretation of Article 20 to prevent
barriers to the development of new digital business
models [9]. The RtDP should not be seen only from legal
perspectives. The IT design community needs to develop
technical and organisational safeguards into personal
management systems for users, allowing them to better
understand how their data is used and maintain agency of
their online presence [22]. De Hert et al. also consider the
possibilities for building interoperable infrastructures
enabling data subjects to bridge the gap between specific
services [7].
In exercising data protection rights beyond data
portability, a wide body of research was conducted prior to
the implementation of the GDPR. Ausloos and Dewitte
found that out of 66 data controllers, only 53% of privacy
policies were deemed satisfactory and 22% of responses
returned were deemed satisfactory [2]. In another study,
106 requests were sent by 7 individuals. It was found that
83% of organisations answered to the access requests,
22% answered subsequent sub-questions, and only 10%
specifically identified both the aspect of the data collected
and with which organisations data were shared [16]. In
the assessment of data controller compliance, using the
example of CCTV footage, it was found that data subjects
were unable to exercise their rights because responses
invoked incorrect or inaccurate legal regulations that
restricted data controllers’ disclosure obligations. Reliance
upon incorrect legislative provisions and delayed responses
to deny access were recurring practices across Europe [19].
More recently, stakeholders have begun exploring the
universal provision of data portability with interoperability
beyond GDPR compliance. The Data Transfer Project is
an open-source platform that facilitates direct portability
of user data between cloud services by converting
proprietary APIs to and from a small number of
standardized data formats that can be used by anyone [6].
This partnership between Facebook, Google, Microsoft,
and Twitter identifies portability and interoperability as
central to innovation, thus promoting user choice,
encouraging responsible product development, and
maximising benefits for users. Marsden goes further and
suggests that interoperability should be applied in law to
allow prosumers (users who actively share and produce
online content) to move to more prosumer-friendly
products if desired [17]. Failure to consider interoperability
can also result in dubious competitive advantage, thus
generating consumer dissatisfaction, requiring significant
legal expenses, and attracting antitrust scrutiny [26].
Data Portability in Practice
Methodology
Our aim was to understand how data controllers have
approached Article 20 by studying their response to
requests. To exercise the RtDP, a Python program was
created to make 230 portability requests. We used e-mail
as the transport for the tool; although some controllers
offer automated download options, this is far from
commonplace (see our results later). On the other hand,
e-mail is commonly used by both data subjects and data
controllers. A single data subject (the first author) made
the requests, and so the data controllers were drawn from
a set of organisations who held personal data about the
data subject. We categorised these data controllers using
the Curlie taxonomy [5]; we omit full results for brevity,
but popular categories included “Publications” (12.6%),
“Software” (11.3%), “(Legal) Services” (9.1%),
“Clothing” (6.5%), “Non-profit Resources” (5.7%) and
“Online Communities” (5.7%).
Data controllers were not told prior to the completion of
exercising the RtDP that these requests were made for
research purposes so as not to prejudice the responses
received. The information required for initiating these
requests include the data controller’s contact information,
expressing the desire to make an RtDP request, and
personally identifiable information of the data subject
such as name, e-mail, and account usernames. The
contact details for Data Protection Officers, or data
controllers more generally if a specific data protection
related e-mail was not identified, were discovered by
manual inspection of websites; typically the privacy policy
or terms and conditions pages. Neither the A29WP or
ICO guidance provide any example e-mail messages for
the RtDP, so a template for the right of access (RoA) was
modified to adhere to the requirements under Article
20 [15]. If no response or no indication of acting upon the
request was received, a reminder e-mail was sent after
three weeks. The study began on the day the GDPR came
into effect (25th May 2018) and the data collection
process ended on the 26th August 2018.
Results
All data controllers listed a contact e-mail address; 173
contact details were found under the terms and conditions
or privacy policy pages, where 104 were specifically
privacy- or data-protection-related and 126 were general.
Even after looking at these pages, contact information
was sometimes only found after being redirected. There
was no consistency for finding contact information in the
remainder. In 19 cases, the e-mail addresses indicated did
not work and an alternative had to be found.
Out of the 230 requests sent, all were successfully
delivered apart from two requests; one because the e-mail
domain no longer existed and the other because of a
bank’s specific e-mail security restrictions. A portability
request for the latter was submitted again via its
mandated web form. Including responses indicating that
no personal data were stored, 163 of the requests were
successfully completed. Out of the remainder, five asked
for the full three months allowed under the GDPR, 29
responded initially but did not react to a follow-up e-mail
reminder, and 33 did not respond at all. 50 replied within
a week of the request being made, then 22 more within
two weeks, and 91 within a month.
In making the requests, 88 data controllers required
additional personal data for verifying identity. From these
requests, 18 required filling out a designated form, 18
required logging in to personal accounts, 14 required
photographic national ID and proof of address, 23
required only an ID, and two required only a proof of
address. Questions such as date of birth, most recent
bank transaction, and other details related to our
interactions within certain services were also asked by 13
data controllers.
A variety of mechanisms were also used by data
controllers for sending responses. 126 responses were sent
by e-mail of which 19 files were password protected, 18
were retrieved through personal login accounts, 17 were
downloaded from an online portal of which eight files were
password protected, two were file passwords received by
post and 2 were full postal responses. 27 data controllers
indicated that they stored no data beyond the e-mail
address and correspondence that we provided and so did
not have any additional data to provide.
Response file type No. of responses
Tabular (CSV/XLS/XLSX) 72 (36.5%)
Documentation (HTML/PDF) 35 (17.8%)
Data (JSON/XML) 29 (14.7%)
Text (TEX/TXT) 15 (7.6%)
Word (DOC/DOCX/RTF) 13 (6.6%)
Text in e-mail body 12 (6.1%)
Screenshots (PNG) 6 (3.0%)
Images (JPEG) 4 (2.0%)
Audio (MP4/WAV) 2 (1.0%)
E-mail (EML/MBOX) 2 (1.0%)
Paper scan (PDF) 2 (1.0%)
Calendar (ICS) 1 (0.5%)
Contacts (VCF) 1 (0.5%)
Mapping (KMZ) 1 (0.5%)
Paper (Print-out) 1 (0.5%)
Source code (Repository) 1 (0.5%)
Table 1: File types used in responses to portability requests.
Responses were provided in numerous different types
(Table 1), the most popular being tabular CSV or Excel
files. Ten data controllers reported that they chose the file
formats (CSV, XML, and JSON) suggested by the ICO.
As some responses contained more than one file type and
more than one file of each type, we normalised the
responses to one file of each type per response to
calculate the percentages in Table 1.
Despite little mention of security in the RtDP guidance,
security had an effect on RtDP responses. Five data
controllers required telephone conversations to confirm
requester identity. Where password-protected files were
used, all data controllers separated the transmission of
data files and passwords. In spite of this focus on security,
two data controller e-mail responses were lost in transit,
suggesting potential vulnerabilities in using e-mail
communication for transmitting personal data files. This
may be exacerbated by the fact that many file types in
Table 1 are often flagged by spam filters.
Within different data controller categories, we saw no
pattern in how data were sent. We saw some small
tendencies for particular file formats in some categories:
Legal Services to Word, Online Communities to Tabular,
and Software to Data, but these were not significant.




Email body 7 3 7
CSV 3 3 3
DOC/DOCX 7 3 7
EML 3 3 3
HTML s 3 s
ICS 3 3 3
JPEG 7 3 7
JSON 3 3 3
KMZ 3 7 3
MBOX 3 3 3
MP4 7 3 7
PDF s 3 s
PNG 7 3 7
RTF 7 3 7
TEX 3 3 3
TXT s 3 s
VCS 3 3 3
WAV 7 3 7
XLS/XLSX 3 3 s
XML 3 3 3
Table 2: RtDP file format compliance based on “structured,
commonly used, and machine-readable” requirements. Most
formats either comply (3) or do not comply (7) with the ICO
definitions but some are ambiguous (s).
There was little consensus on what is required for full
compliance with Article 20. Importantly, although all data
controllers indicated that their responses comply with
Article 20, it is questionable whether data were always
delivered in a “structured, commonly used,
machine-readable format”. Table 2 lists file-format
compliance based on the ICO’s “structured, commonly
used, and machine-readable format” definitions. We
consider a format to be “structured” where structural
relation between elements are explicit, “commonly used”
where formats are identifiable beyond the data controller’s
usage, and “machine-readable” where data can be
identified, recognised, and extracted in processing. It is
not always clear whether a format meets all the criteria.
For example, CSV files are compliant because there are
structural relationships between elements within tabular
data, is a commonly used format, and can be processed by
computers. By contrast, although HTML is a commonly
used format for web pages, it is only structured and
machine-readable with markup. Formats may fall into grey
areas (marked s) where specific technical processing or
levels of metadata beyond its default format standard are
required. For instance PDF files may be machine-readable
if they contain text, but not so much if they contain
images or scans. 40% of the file formats were identified as
fully-compliant: CSV, EML, ICS, JSON, MBOX, TEX,
VCS, and XML. Even if the personal data held by data
controllers were structured and machine-readable during
processing, the extraction process made some files
non-compliant. For instance, with screenshots and paper
scans, although the information was provided, the choice
of format made machine-readability difficult.
Finally, we observed some confusion between the different
rights in the GDPR. Four data controllers misunderstood
our RtDP request as exercising the RoA. Two went
further to suggest that we make a RoA request instead so
that we can have more personal data. Four RtDP requests
were conflated with the right to erasure and the right to
restrict processing. Four data controllers explicitly noted
that our RtDP requests were the first they had received.
After completing the requests, one data controller asked
us for feedback on what we thought about the process
and compliance. One data controller initially said that no
data were stored but came back a month later with
personal data that were previously not revealed. Two data
controllers mentioned that they were unsure whether
certain data were required under the GDPR. One data
controller claimed that their system could not provide
information in a machine-readable format. Our study also
caused one data breach, where a response to our RtDP
included personal data of other data subjects.
Making Portable Data Portable
Our results show problems around portability both for
data controllers, who may misunderstand requirements or
provide data in inappropriate or incomplete formats, and
data subjects, who may be unable to verify their identity
or verify the veracity of the data returned by a controller.
Our study is still at an early stage and raises several
possibilities for future work.
We have only examined file formats so far, but this has
shown that it is difficult to determine what files are
compliant and what files are not. One avenue for future
work is to examine the content of our responses to further
clarify how and when certain formats comply, what
content should be included in RtDP responses, and what
may be necessary to ensure compliance.
Technically-advanced definitions or standards for
“structured, commonly used, and machine-readable”
could be provided so that it becomes actionable, allowing
appropriate tests to be designed.
We have examined data transfers from data controller to
data subject, but Article 20 also offers a mechanism for
data subjects to request that their data be transferred
directly to another data controller. Future work is needed
to explore how this can enable data subjects to use Article
20 as a mechanism for data protection, by making RtDP
requests to transfer interoperable data to other controllers.
But given the state of the art shown in our current work,
we suggest that such a future study wait until data
controllers have become more familiar with Article 20.
Building upon the metadata from the RtDP responses
received, more empirical work can be done to assess the
feasibility of interoperability. As interoperability is not
required by the GDPR, there is no obligation to apply
transmitted data from one service to another. Portable
data itself can be transmitted but the spirit and value of
portability is lost if data is not meaningfully reused by
other data controllers. Additionally, existing methods for
verifying data subject identities such as phone calls and
the necessity to clarify RtDP data required may act as
hurdles for enabling interoperable data. Based on the
metadata received from RtDP responses, the
interoperability of specific categories, such as social
networks, can be explored. Challenges for interoperability,
such as the technological infrastructures required, the
problems with existing verification processes, and what
categories of data controllers can be made interoperable,
should be examined to ensure that portable data is legally
and technologically portable.
Finally, we are also exploring technological routes for
helping data subjects to exercise data protection rights
such as the RtDP, integrating identification and secure
storage to make it easier to make and verify requests.
Conclusion
In this paper we examined the GDPR’s RtDP by making
230 real-world requests. We found a variety of file formats
being returned by data controllers, some of which may not
comply with the obligations in Article 20, and some
confusion between the various rights in the GDPR on the
part of data controllers. Future work is needed to help
both data controllers and data subjects understand and
exercise these rights.
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